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RECENT DECISIONS
broadcast of a defamatory remark would seem to be as potentially
harmful as a mere publication contained in a writing, or as not less
in capacity for damage than the classifications of slander for which
no special damage need be proved. Logic and policy, as enunciated
by Mr. Justice Fuld, point to the conclusion that defamation by radio
should be actionable per se, eliminating the difficult problem which
confronts courts where the defamation is the result of a broadcast. 29
A. J. S.
PROPERTY IN IDEAS - ORIGINAL AND CONCRETE - CONTRACT,
ExPREss OR ImPL ED.-This is an action for damages based upon a
breach of a contract by which plaintiff agreed to disclose his process
for manufacturing laminated canvas soles, and to instruct defendant
in the use of said process. Defendant agreed to pay plaintiff 10% of
the selling price realized from the sales of such soles. Thereafter
the process was adopted and used by defendant in manufacturing that
type of sole, but the defendant nevertheless has neglected and refused
to remunerate plaintiff at the stipulated rate, prompting him to in-
stitute this action. The defense interposed, inter alia, is that plaintiff
is not entitled to recover because the process was not new or novel;
and that no one can have a proprietary interest in ideas well known
to others. Held, judgment for plaintiff affirmed. The recovery is
justified on the theory that plaintiff did have a property right in the
formula which he disclosed to defendant as the subject matter of
their agreement. Schonwald v. Burkart Manufacturing Co., - Mo.
-, 202 S. W. 2d 7 (1947).
The court reasoned that, just as ownership of wild animals de-
pends entirely upon keeping them in captivity, so too does ownership
of ideas ordinarily depend on non-disclosure. And as the ownership
of a beast terminates with its escape,' in like manner ownership of
an idea ends by disclosure. However, when ideas are embodied in a
concrete plan for accomplishing a desired result, the one who con-
ceived the plan has a right to contract with reference to its disclosure,
even though he did not originate it in the sense that no one else ever
had similar ideas. This case does not turn on an unauthorized use
of an asserted property right in a disclosed idea, but rather on a
promise to pay for its authorized use.
As a general proposition, in the absence of an express agreement,
the originator or proprietor of an abstract idea which cannot be sold,
appropriated or used without disclosure, cannot hold liable one who
29 SEE.mAN, THE Lw oF LIEL AND SLANDER IN THE STATE OF Naw
YoRx 3 (1933).1 Fleet v. Hegeman, 14 Wend. 42, 43 (N. Y. 1835).
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utilizes the idea for his own benefit.2 In particular, recovery cannot
be had if the idea is neither original or new, nor where it has not
been reduced to concrete form before being divulged to another.3
The decision in the instant case exemplifies the trend of thought
away from the traditional concept that there could be no proprietary
interest in an idea as such. Typical of that traditional view was an
early New York case,4 in which the plaintiff had imparted to defen-
dant's president his idea for a new method of soliciting life insurance,
which he claimed was subsequently adopted. The dismissal of his
complaint was affirmed on appeal. The court stated that it was dif-
ficult to conceive how a claim to a mere idea or scheme, unconnected
with physical devices to carry it out, could be made the subject matter
of property. ". . . as long as the originator of the idea ... keeps it
to himself, it is his exclusive property, but it ceases to be his own
when it passes from him." 5
Apparently, that is the view which still prevails in most juris-
dictions, 6 where the courts have uniformly refused to protect ideas
in the abstract, owing to the difficulties of enforcing such rights.
On the other hand, plaintiff's recovery in the instant case indicates
that the difficulties certainly are not insurmountable. As a matter
of fact, the judiciary of New York has been granting relief in similar
cases; at least when the plaintiff can show that his idea was not only
original and novel, but also was reduced to concrete form and sub-
mitted to the defendant under circumstances indicating that compen-
sation was expected if the idea were used. When these prerequisites
exist, recovery may be obtained upon the theory of a contract implied
in fact or in law. Thus, in a recent case,7 the plaintiff recovered
the fair and reasonable value of advice, suggestions and ideas which
were furnished defendant in connection with the manufacture and
marketing of compressed candy tablets. Substantial damages were
thereby recovered, notwithstanding plaintiff's failure to allege an ex-
press contract between the parties for compensation to plaintiff in
the event such advice, suggestions and ideas were used. And in
2 Haskins v. Ryan, 71 N. J. Eq. 575, 64 Ati. 436 (1906).
3 Stone v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 260 App. Div. 450, 23 N. Y. S. 2d
210 (lst Dep't 1940); Alberts v. Remington Rand, Inc., 175 Misc. 486, 23
N. Y. S. 2d 892 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
1"Bristol v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 52 Hun 161, 5 N. Y. Supp.
131 (N. Y. 1889), aff'd mem., 132 N. Y. 264, 30 N. E. 506 (1892).
, Bristol v. Equitable Life Assurince Soc., 52 Hun 161 165 5 N Y. Supp.
131, 132 (N. Y. 1889), aff'd memr., 132 N. Y. 264, 30 N. 'E. 506 (i892) ; see
also Grombach Productions, Inc. v. Waring, 293 N. Y. 609, 59 N. E. 2d 425
(1944); Williamson v. New York Central R. R., 258 App. Div. 226, 16
N. Y. S. 2d 217 (1939); but cf. Matarese v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 158
F. 2d 631 (C. C. A. 2d 1946).
6 Lueddecke v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 70 F. 2d 345 (C. C. A. 1934); Thomas
v. P. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 350 Pa. 262, 38 A. 2d 61 (1944); Stein v.
Morris, 120 Va. 390, 91 S. E. 177 (1917).
7American Mint Corp. v. Ex-Lax, Inc., 263 App. Div. 89, 31 N. Y. S. 2d
708 (Ist Dep't 1941).
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Cole v. Phillips Lord, Inc.,8 the appellate court reversed a dismissal
of the complaint in which plaintiff sought to recover damages occa-
sioned by defendant's exploitation of ideas which the plaintiff had
evolved into a formula for a radio program. Plaintiff alleged that
he had intrusted the formula to defendant for sale, but the latter had
misappropriated it under the name, "Mr. District Attorney." These
allegations were held .sufficient to constitute a prima facie contract,
under which the formula had been imparted to defendant. Such a
contract would afford protection to plaintiff, even as to his mere ideas.
And likewise in Healey v. R. H. Macy & Co.,9 the plaintiff was al-
lowed to recover the reasonable value of slogans and ideas with which
he had furnished defendint for use in its Christmas advertising
campaign.
These decisions represent a long stride forward, in that they pro-
vide a remedy to "idea men" who were obliged to go without redress
while others exploited with impunity their lucrative ideas. Through
decisions of this kind, ihe courts are manifesting a flexibility of
judicial thought designed-to meet the ever-changing needs of society.
J. F. K.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE-CONVICTION BASED ON EVIDENCE OB-
TAINED IN SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST ON UNRELATED CHARGE.-
Subsequent to petitioner's arrest on a charge of violation of the Mail
Fraud Statute I and the National Stolen Property Act 2 five federal
officers embarked on an extensive search of the apartment wherein
petitioner was arrested. After five hours searching for evidence con-
nected with the crime charged, one of the officers found in a bureau
drawer under some clothes an envelope marked: "George Harris,
personal papers." In this envelope were found notice of classifica-
tion cards and registration certificates the possession of which was
in violation of the Selective Service Act 3 and the Federal Criminal
Code.4 Petitioner was convicted of violating both regulations. The
circuit court affirmed the conviction and certiorari was granted.
Held, conviction affirmed. Harris v. United States, - U. S. -,
91 L. ed. 1013 (1947).
Petitioner bases his appeal on two grounds: First, the search
which produced the classification cards and registration certificates
8262 App. Div. 116, 28 N. Y. S. 2d 404 (1st Dep't 1941).
9251 App. Div. 440, 297 N. Y. Supp. 165 (1937), aff mem., 277 N. Y.
681, 14 N. E. 2d 388 (1937) ; cf. How J. Ryan & Associates v. Century Brew-
ing Ass'n, 185 Wash. 600, 55 P. 2d 1053 (1936).
135 STAT. 1130 (1909), 18 U. S. C. §338 (1940).
253 STAT. 1178 (1939), 18 U. S. C. §§413-419 (1940).
8 54 STAT. 885, 894, 895 (1940), 50 U. S. C. § 311 (1940).
'35 STAT. 1098 (1909), 18 U. S. C. § 101 (1940).
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